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The Role of Empirical Research in the 
Study of Complex Forms of Governance 
in Agroindustrial Systems1
Guilherme Fowler A. Monteiro2, Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes3, 
Silvia Morales de Queiroz Caleman4 e Décio Zylbersztajn5 
Abstract: The growing complexity of supply chains poses new challenges for 
Agricultural Research Centers and statistical agencies. The aim of this perspective 
paper is to discuss the role of empirical research in understanding the complex 
forms of governance in agribusiness. The authors argue that there are three 
fundamental levels of analysis: (i) the basic structure of the market, (ii) the formal 
contractual arrangements that govern relations within the agroindustrial system 
and (iii) the transactional dimensions governed by non-contractual means. The 
case of the agrochemical industry in Brazil illustrates how traditional analyses 
that only address market structure are insufficient to fully explain the agricultural 
sector and its supply chain. The article concludes by suggesting some indicators 
which could be collected by statistical agencies to improve understanding of the 
complex relationships among agribusiness segments. In doing so, the paper seeks 
to minimize costs and to enable a better formulation of public and private policies.
Key-words: complex forms, empirical research, market structure, contracts, non-
measurable attributes.
Resumo: A crescente complexidade das relações entre os agentes das cadeias produtivas 
coloca novos desafios para os centros de pesquisa e estatística do setor agrícola. O objetivo 
do presente artigo é discutir o papel da pesquisa empírica para o entendimento das formas 
complexas de governança no setor agroindustrial. Os autores argumentam que há três níveis 
fundamentais de análise: (i) a estrutura básica do mercado, (ii) o regime contratual formal 
que rege as relações dentro do sistema agroindustrial e (iii) as dimensões transacionais 
governadas por meios não contratuais. O caso da indústria de agroquímicos no Brasil 
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1. Introduction
Just like other industries, the agroindustrial 
sector is experiencing a period of rapid 
transformations which are not the result of 
an isolated factor occurring in a single point in 
time. The changes that today characterize the 
agroindustrial sector arise from adjustments that 
have accumulated over time, thereby creating 
a new productive and organizational reality. 
This reality is mainly expressed thought the 
development of complex relationships among 
the agents that operate in the various segments 
of the supply chains.
In the Brazilian case, researchers have 
witnessed a growing interdependence between 
the agricultural sector and the up- and 
downstream segments since the 1970s. The input 
sector, for instance, has taken on a key role in 
fostering technological advances in agriculture, 
substantially contributing to the spectacular 
increase in agricultural productivity in Brazil 
in the last decades. Perhaps more importantly, 
the relationship between the agricultural sector 
and the input segment has shifted over time 
from a strict market position (i.e., where price 
and quantity represent the basic coordination 
vectors) to a more complex position characterized 
by the establishment of contractual arrangements 
among the agents.
The emergence of contractual arrangements 
has also occurred in other countries. As an example, 
Kunkel et al. (2009) note that the incidence of 
contracts in the U.S. agrifood production reached 
41% in 2005. According to the authors, contracts 
encompassed 39% of the transactions in 2003, 
36% in 2001, 28% in 1991, and 11% in 1969. In 
line with this trend, the issue of agricultural con-
tracts has been broadly studied (MASTEN, 2000; 
MENARD, 1996; MARTINEZ, 2002; MONDELLI 
and ZYLBERSZTAJN, 2008; BARJOLLE, 2001; 
JAMES et al., 2007; LOADER, 1996; SAUVÉE, 2002; 
RAYNAUD and SAUVEE, 2004)6.
In empirical terms, the increasing use of 
contracts in agriculture brings more complexity 
to the study of the agribusiness sector. It happens 
because much of the relevant information is not 
revealed by the prices established in the market, 
but is embedded in the contractual clauses. As a 
result, researchers have to examine not only the 
basic market conditions, but also the contractual 
relationships between agents in the different 
sectors of agricultural production7.
6 Specifically in the case of Brazil, the use of contracts 
as economic coordination devices has already been 
studied in the soybean production sector (LEME and 
ZYLBERSZTAJN, 2008), in the paper and cellulose 
segment (SOUZA et al., 2009; GUIMARÃES et al., 2011; 
SILVA et al., 2009), in aviculture (ZYLBERSZTAJN 
and NOGUEIRA, 2002), in tomato production 
(ZYLBERSZTAJN and NADALINI, 2007), in the seed 
industry (ZYLBERSZTAJN and LAZZARINI, 2005), in the 
biofuel sector (DALMONECH et al., 2010; PEIXOTO, 2008), 
in the tobacco sector (BEGNIS et al., 2007), in meat 
production (PINOTTI and PAULILLO, 2006; MIELE 
and WAQUIL, 2007; SILVA and SAES, 2007; BRUM and 
JANK, 2001), in the fruit sector (SAES, 2007; SAMPAIO, 2007; 
SOUZA FILHO et al., 2010), and in food franchising 
(SILVA and AZEVEDO, 2007). For a general assessment see 
Zylbersztajn (2005a).
7 It should be noted that here already lies a major challenge for 
Brazilian researchers. In the U.S., the agricultural census – and 
related research – has collected information on contracts since 
1969, but in Brazil researchers lack a systematic database on the 
subject.
ilustra como as análises tradicionais que trazem apenas informações sobre a estrutura de mercado são insuficientes 
para se entender completamente o setor agrícola e sua cadeia produtiva. Conclui-se com algumas sugestões de 
indicadores que poderiam ser coletados pelos centros de estatística como forma de aprimorar o entendimento das 
relações complexas entre os segmentos agroindustriais, minimizando custos e resultando em melhor elaboração de 
ações de políticas públicas e privadas.
Palavras-chaves: formas complexas, pesquisa empírica, estrutura de mercado, contratos, atributos não 
mensuráveis.
Classificação JEL: Q10, L1, L14.
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The present paper, however, points to 
a third level of analysis that has so far been 
ignored, suggesting an even greater challenge 
for researchers and statistical agencies. As noted 
by Zylbersztajn (2009), the systematic collection 
of data from contracts tends to be inherently 
limited, capturing only part of the incentives 
present in most institutional arrangements. 
If data based on contracts is used without 
considering the transactional dimensions 
governed by other means – or the relational and 
dynamic aspects of learning embedded in the 
contractual relationships –, the analytical results 
can lead to erroneous conclusions. In other 
words, empirical research into the agribusiness 
sector should consider three levels of analysis: (i) 
the basic structure of the market (price, quantity, 
etc.); (ii) the formal contractual arrangements 
that govern relations between agents; and (iii) 
the transactional dimensions governed by non-
-contractual means.
The objective of this perspective paper 
is to discuss the role of empirical research in 
understanding complex forms of governance in 
agribusiness. The paper is structured as follows: 
1. Introduction, 2. Overview of the empirical 
studies in Brazil, 3. Analytical perspective, 4. 
Illustration, and 5. Concluding remarks.
2. Empirical studies in Brazil:  
taking step
In order to characterize the current state of the 
Brazilian empirical research in agribusiness, the 
authors conducted an exploratory analysis of the 
quarterly issues of the Journal of Rural Economics and 
Sociology (Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural8). 
Enjoying a high reputation in Brazil’s academic 
and business milieu, the journal represents an 
important database for scientific studies in the 
Brazilian agribusiness sector. Specifically, the 
authors made a deliberate effort to identify the 
source(s) of the data used in the papers published 
from 2005 to 2010, making a distinction between 
8 www.revistasober.org
primary sources of information (i.e., information 
collected by the researcher herself through data 
gathering) and secondary sources of information 
(i.e., information provided by a statistical agency). 
As a general result, the authors identified that 
secondary sources for data are present in most 
studies. As table 1 shows, 66% of the studies are 
based on secondary data, 24% use primary data, 
and 9% use both forms of data collection. Table 1 
also indicates a moderate growth in the use of 
primary data over time, from 20% in 2005 to 
24% in 2009. In any event, the prevalence of the 
application of secondary data for the formulation 
of empirical studies is indisputable. Noting that 
Brazil does not have a systematic collection of 
data on agricultural contracts, one can conclude 
that most studies do not consider the contractual 
aspects of agribusiness despite the growing 
importance of this issue.
It is also interesting to examine the topics of 
the studies that use primary data, so that one 
can identify the alignment of the form of data 
collection with the research subject. Table 2 shows 
that from all research based on primary data, 
topics such as “technological aspects”, “socio-
-environmental aspects”, and “market structure” 
are the most representative. It appears therefore 
that even in studies where the empirical variables 
are related to the structure of the market, primary 
sources of data can play a major role. This finding 
is not without a degree of surprise, suggesting that 
in some cases even the basic market information 
is not readily available for Brazilian researchers. 
In general terms, the available evidence 
suggests that the empirical research in Brazil 
needs to be improved and it still lacks a 
systematic collection of data on contractual 
forms of governance in agribusiness. In order 
to advance the analysis we propose in the next 
section a simple framework that may help a better 
understanding of the agribusiness sector, serving 
as a basis for the improvement of data collection. 
The framework is not limited to the Brazilian 
situation. The aim is to describe the theoretical 
foundations that provide the basis for a broader 
analysis of the agribusiness sector.
RESR, Piracicaba-SP, Vol. 50, Nº 4, p. 667-682, Out/Dez 2012 – Impressa em Janeiro de 2013
670    The Role of Empirical Research in the Study of Complex Forms of Governance in Agroindustrial Systems  
Table 1. Form of data collection: Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural.
Secondary Data Primary Data Both Total
 No. of articles (%) No. of articles (%) No. of articles (%) No. of articles (%)
2005 28 80 7 20 0 0 35 100
2006 18 58 9 29 4 13 31 100
2007 26 67 8 21 5 13 39 100
2008 25 63 11 28 4 10 40 100
2009 24 63 9 24 5 13 38 100
2010* 6 67 3 33 0 0 9 100
Total 127 66 47 24 18 9 192 100
*Articles published in the first volume of 2010.
Source: Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural (RESR), various years. Prepared by the authors.
Table 2. Number of articles using primary data: main themes.
Contractual 
aspects
Technological 
aspects
Physical (geographical) 
aspects
Socio-environmental 
aspects
Market  
structure
2005 1 3 1 4 1
2006 1 7 0 5 4
2007 2 5 0 4 7
2008 3 4 1 7 5
2009 2 5 0 4 4
2010 1 1 0 1 1
Total 10 25 2 25 22
Source: Source: Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural (RESR), various years. Prepared by the authors.
3. An analytical framework
Most of the time, empirical studies in 
agribusiness involve the recognition of the 
relevant empirical variables which provide a 
better understanding of the interactions in the 
food chains. Before discussing the variables that 
support the empirical studies, however, it is 
necessary to identify the theoretical assumptions 
that underlie such studies.
Generally speaking, an implicit assumption 
exists that one cannot understand the current 
dynamics of agriculture without analyzing 
the relationships between the segments of the 
supply chains. That is, studies normally set a 
systemic perspective on agriculture which enables 
us to understand how the transactions between 
the different production sectors are coordinated 
(ZYLBERZSTAJN, 1996). The adoption of a 
systemic approach of agribusiness, in turn, 
requires knowledge of the organization and the 
internal dynamics of each agricultural segment, 
in conjunction with knowledge of the business 
environment (i.e., organizational and institutional 
environments).
Especially in relation to the business 
environment, studies seek to understand 
the formulation of strategies in the face of 
restrictions imposed by the so-called “rules of the 
game” (NORTH, 1991, 2005). It is assumed that 
institutions determine the environment in which 
transactions occur, while providing the structure 
of incentives and controls that induce cooperation 
among agents. From this perspective, the business 
environment encompasses the formal rules – 
i.e., macroeconomic and commercial policies 
adopted by governments, trading partners and 
competitors –, as well as informal rules. The 
figure below illustrates the argument.
In line with the systemic approach, studies 
of agribusiness systems can focus on firms, 
industries, or strictly coordinated sub-systems9. 
9 For the definition of strictly coordinated sub-system see 
Zylbersztajn, D. and Farina, E. M. M. Q. (1999) Strictly 
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Figure 1. Typical Agroindustrial System.
Institutional Environment
Input
T1 T2 T3 T4
Agriculture Industry Distibution Consumption
Organizational Environment
Source: Based on Zylbersztajn (1996) – Ti means transaction i.
Such studies are based on two main elements, 
namely: (i) the market structure that characterizes 
each segment of the production system, and (ii) 
the relationships between agents who work within 
and between segments (transaction analysis). 
These elements are primarily associated with two 
theoretical approaches, respectively: the Theory 
of Industrial Organization (IO) and Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE).
The Theory of Industrial Organization 
examines the market structures, its patterns of 
competition, and the implications for public 
policy and business strategies (SCHERER and 
ROSS, 1990; OSTER, 1994). The key question 
involves the pattern of competition between the 
agribusiness segments and sub-segments. The 
focus of the analysis is the technological and 
strategic determinants that shape a particular 
market structure.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the purpose 
of analysis of agribusiness goes beyond the 
investigation of competition, including also the 
coordination of the production chain, the analysis 
of industrial organization tends to be adapted 
to allow the study of inter-segment governance 
structures. As a result, the explanatory power 
of industrial organization is enlarged to focus 
on the internal structure of organizations 
(NICKERSON, 2000). Although this apparent 
expansion of the analytical scope of IO is 
theoretically attractive, one should note that it 
is not free from criticism. Governance structures 
Coordinated Food Systems: Exploring the Limits of 
the Coasian Firm, International Food and Agribusiness 
Management Review, v. 2, n. 2, pp. 249-265.
are not really addressed in the work traditionally 
associated with the theory of industrial 
organization. In general, it is implicitly assumed 
that the most efficient governance structure will 
be adopted through some mechanism associated 
with competitive rivalry.
The issue of organizational adaptation 
only becomes possible with the development 
of the Transaction Cost Economics approach 
introduced by Ronald Coase (1960, 1991), and 
more recently by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1996). 
According to this approach, efficiency relates 
to the minimization of transaction costs, which 
requires examining the alignment between the 
governance structure and the attributes of the 
transaction. In general, TCE emphasizes three 
attributes: transaction frequency, asset specificity, 
and uncertainty. According to Williamson (1985), 
asset specificity is the key variable for selecting 
an effective form of governance. An asset is 
considered specific to a transaction when its 
reallocation implies loss of value.
The alignment model proposed by 
Williamson (1985, 1996) creates a continuum of 
governance forms whose extremes are market 
relationships and vertical integration, asset 
specificity being the displacement factor. According 
to Peterson et al. (2001), as we move from the spot 
market towards vertical integration, the market 
gives way to coordination efforts in a constant 
search for reduction of transaction costs. In this 
sense, the performance of a particular agribusiness 
system is related to its coordination capabilities – 
i.e., structures of governance – which include not 
only the current price system (the market), but 
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also the role played by “non-market”, contractual 
relations (hybrid forms and hierarchy).
Specifically in the case of intermediary 
solutions – i.e., neither market nor hierarchies 
– Menard (2004) argues in favor of a deeper 
comprehension of the nature and the 
characteristics of hybrid forms of organization. 
Menard (2004) states that additional mechanisms 
to contracts, such as reputation and trust, should 
be considered as key variables in the study of the 
efficiency of transactions. Partnerships, strategic 
alliances and business networks are increasingly 
frequent as organizational formats in agribusiness, 
being therefore subject to a closer look.
The above description suggests the existence 
of two basic levels of analysis. On one hand, 
the study of agribusiness systems involves the 
examination of the market structure. On the 
other, the study of food chains encompasses the 
analysis of contractual coordination. Although 
this conceptual framework characterizes much of 
the empirical research in agribusiness, the present 
article points to a third level of analysis that has so 
far been ignored, namely the transactional dimen-
sions governed by explicit non-contractual forms.
According to Barzel (1997), every transaction 
can be broken down into different attributes 
(or dimensions). Each attribute is related to a 
property right and may be associated with a 
given level of measurement cost. In general 
terms, the value of an asset can be dissipated 
if the property rights over its attributes are not 
properly delineated, which can occur if it is 
hard to measure – and therefore contract for – 
a given attribute (ZYLBERZSTAJN, 2005). For 
example, because the color of an apple is an easily 
observable dimension, a supermarket chain can 
establish a contract with producers in which 
color is a transacted attribute. However, because 
the flavor of an apple is not easily measured ex 
ante, the supermarket chain is unable to establish 
an unambiguous contract for the apple’s flavor 
which can be effectively secured by law.
Barzel (1997) makes a distinction between 
legal property rights and economic property 
rights. The former refers to that which the state 
“guarantees” to an agent. The latter is the agent’s 
ability, in expected terms, to consume the goods or 
services associated with a given asset. Legal rights 
are the basis of agreements whose enforcement 
is straightforwardly dependent on the state. 
Such agreements are outlined as contracts and 
take place in the market. The state is in charge of 
setting restrictions with which the contract must 
conform. Once these restrictions are delineated, 
however, individuals are free to establish among 
themselves the most appropriate contract terms 
to meet their varying needs10.
At the opposite extreme to the design of 
contracts we are faced with non-contractual 
agreements which are characterized by a less 
precise definition of the transacted attributes due 
to high measurement costs. The enforcement of 
these agreements is generally associated with the 
existence of a long-term relationship sustained 
by agents’ reputation or a guarantee mechanism 
supported by third parties.
Because the perfect measurement of the attri-
butes of an asset is always costly (BARZEL, 1997), 
contracts explicitly describe some attributes of 
the transaction, implicitly delineate others, but 
do not consider all transacted dimensions. Even 
so, attributes whose measurement is too costly 
remain part of the transaction. As a result, contracts 
and long-term relationships can coexist in an 
exchange process, and the study of agribusiness 
systems must also consider the transactional 
dimensions governed by non-contractual means.
As an example, one can think of a particular 
organizational arrangement that derives from 
a strategy that involves tacit knowledge.11 
10 It is worth noting that the effectiveness of a contract 
depends largely on the precision of its terms; as a result 
individuals tend to use explicit, standardized measures of 
the attributes transacted. The use of uniform measures gives 
to the contract its impersonal character. On the other hand, 
the efficiency of the enforcement by the state depends on (a) 
the existence of explicit, objective dispute resolution criteria, 
(b) the clear delineation of the laws, and (c) the efficiency of 
judges and other elements of the judiciary.
11 Inspired by the work of Penrose (1959), this literature 
argues that the ownership of strategic resources (or 
competences) represents the firms’ main source of 
competitive advantage. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) adopt 
the concept of core competence which encompasses the 
collective learning and the coordination of different tasks 
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Figure 2. Levels of Analysis.
Firm 
Industry 
Segments
Transaction
(within /
between 
rms)
Technological 
determinants 
Strategic
 determinants 
Easily 
Measurable 
Attributes 
Diculty 
to measure 
attributes
1.  MARKET STRUCTURE 
2. CONTRACT
3. NON-CONTRACTUAL MECHANISM 
(guarantee; reputation; routines; learning)
Table 3. Analytical Framework.
1. Market structure 2. Contract 3. Non-contractual mechanisms
Main  
argument
Technological and strategic 
determinants influence the 
market structure of the firm, 
industry, and segment. 
Coordination may occur through  
three mechanisms: price, contracts, or 
vertical integration. The choice of  
governance mechanism basically  
results from the degree of asset specificity.
The value of an asset can be  
dissipated if the property  
rights over its attributes are not  
properly delineated.
Unit of analysis Firm, industry, or segment. Transaction. Attributes whose measurement is costly.
Empirical  
variables 
Data about price, quantity,  
costs, existence and  
magnitude of entry barriers, 
import/export level etc.
Type and magnitude of asset  
specificity: locational, physical,  
human, dedicated, and brand.
Aspects of reputation, guarantees 
provided by third parties, routines, 
and learning.
If knowledge cannot be formally encoded or is 
not subject to decomposition, the governance of 
the production system may include the search 
for consensus. The emergence of some consensus 
mechanism encompasses a negotiation process 
and the possibility of mutual adjustments 
(MENARD, 2004). The mode of coordination then 
probably includes some routine and a process of 
learning through feedback rather than centrally-
-planned decision making.
Figure 2 and Table 3 summarize the argument.
within the organization. Langlois (1992) uses the term 
capabilities. Teece et al. (1997) define dynamic capabilities 
as the key asset of a company. Some authors use the term 
knowledge-based view (KOGUT and ZANDER, 1992).
4. Illustration: the agrochemical 
industry in Brazil
With the aim of clarifying the argument 
presented in section 2, we discuss in this section 
a brief illustration of an important upstream 
sector: the agrochemical industry. The discussion 
is based on Saes et al. (2009). As shown below, 
the analysis of the market structure and the 
competition pattern in the agrochemical 
industry in Brazil can be largely developed from 
secondary data. However, such information does 
not allow a thorough understanding of industry 
strategy and its impact on other productive 
sectors. Accordingly, empirical analysis has to be 
enhanced in order to take account of contractual 
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aspects and the role played by reputation. Given 
this fact, we examine a set of primary data 
gathered from interviews with industry players.
4.1. Market structure and competition  
in the agrochemical industry
In order to discuss the dynamics of Brazil’s 
agrochemical industry and its impact on 
other segments of the agroindustrial chain, 
Saes et al. (2009) start their study by characterizing 
the structure of the market. Information about 
demand for agrochemicals was obtained through 
secondary data12. Specifically, the authors 
analyzed data from the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE)13 and the 
National Supply Corporation (Conab)14.
Between 1976 and 2007, the area dedicated to 
the cultivation of grain in the country grew by 25%, 
strongly boosting the demand for agrochemicals. 
Moreover, the authors note that the largest growth 
in grain cultivation occurred during the late 1990s, 
mainly as a result of the expansion of soybean 
crops. However, demand for agrochemicals is 
not uniform throughout the different regions of 
the country, among the different crops, and the 
various classes of pesticides15.
Another secondary source used to qualify 
the demand was the National Union of the 
Agrochemical Industry (Sindag16). According to 
the last survey available, the state of São Paulo 
was characterized as the major consumer 
of agrochemicals with a total consumption 
of US$ 808.2 million or 20.6% of the value 
traded in 2006. Other major consumers are the 
states of Mato Grosso (17.9%), Paraná (13.4%), 
Rio Grande do Sul (10.4%), Minas Gerais (9.0%), 
Goiás (8.8%), Bahia (6.0%), and Mato Grosso do 
Sul (4.7%).
12 The demand for agrochemicals is determined by technical 
production aspects (coefficient of use and degree of 
effectiveness), by the availability and extension of rural 
credit, and especially by the expansion of the planted area.
13 www.ibge.gov.br 
14 www.conab.org.br
15 For instance, herbicide, fungicide, insecticide, and acaricide.
16 www.sindag.com.br 
Data from Sindag also allowed the authors 
to differentiate the demand according to crop 
use. Soybean emerges as the largest recipient of 
agrochemicals, consuming 38.5% of the value 
traded in 2006, followed by sugar cane and 
cotton. Taken together, these three crops account 
for 61.4% of total pesticide acquisition.
Finally, data from the Institute of Agricultural 
Economics (IEA17) was used to complement the 
analysis of demand. It was found that herbicides 
accounted for the greatest value of agrochemicals 
sold in the state of Sao Paulo in 2006: US$ 348.1 million 
or 43.1% of the industry’s revenues in the state. In 
quantitative terms, the consumption of herbicides 
in Sao Paulo reached 48,370 tones (46.4% of the 
total). These results are best explained by the 
composition of agricultural production in Sao 
Paulo which concentrates on herbicide-dependent 
crops: soybean, sugar cane, and corn.
Regarding the analysis of the supply of 
agrochemicals, a systematic collection of data is 
not available since relevant information is private 
and deemed strategic by the firms. Against this 
backdrop, information was found in specialized 
publications18. This data allowed the authors to 
evaluate the concentration of agrochemicals in the 
domestic market. Basically, two indicators were 
calculated: the concentration ratio (CR4) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). The average 
CR4 for Brazil’s agrochemical industry is 52% 
(i.e., the industry’s four largest firms represent 
52% of the market) and the average HHI is 928. 
According to Motta (2004), a highly concentrated 
market is one with an HHI above 1800. The results, 
therefore, are not conclusive: the CR4 suggests a 
market concentration, whereas the HHI does not. 
By and large, although the manufacture of active 
ingredients19 is concentrated in the agrochemical 
industry, the dominance of a single firm is not 
17 www.iea.sp.gov.br 
18 Specialized publications include Gazeta Mercantil, Agroanalysis, 
Preços Agrícolas, and sectorial studies by Brazil’s state 
development bank, BNDES.
19 Active ingredients are the complex molecules that result from the 
activities of R&D. These are molecules that carry some type of 
herbicide, fungicide, insecticide, or acaricide property.
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Figure 3. Herbicides: Price evolution (Low competition, High competition and Monopoly), São Paulo,  
1st quarter/2000 to 4th quarter/2007.
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observed. Hence, the information allows us to 
argue that the Brazilian agrochemical market 
presents characteristics of an oligopoly.
An important aspect is the fact that although 
gaining access to the agrochemical market can be 
difficult due to high initial investments in R&D, 
smaller firms may enter the industry through 
the production of pesticides whose patents have 
already expired (generic agrochemicals). The 
National Association of Agrochemical Companies 
(Aenda)20 estimates that market for generic 
products represents between 60% and 70% of the 
global market.
From this perspective, the agrochemical market 
can be divided into two groups. On one hand, there 
are companies that sell patented products and 
eventually commercialize generic agrochemicals. 
On the other hand, there are companies that only 
produce generic agrochemicals. Considering 
that the manufacture of active ingredients is 
concentrated, the agrochemical industry has 
characteristics of an oligopoly with a competitive 
fringe: the nucleus includes firms that sell 
patented products and the fringe encompasses 
companies that only sell generic products.
According to Aenda, the Brazilian market 
was characterized in 2007 by 59 generic products 
20 www.aenda.org.br 
whose supply was diversified, i.e., existence of 
at least three producers. The domestic market is 
also characterized by the existence of products 
marketed by two companies. In this case, the 
provision of an active ingredient can be either 
the result of a competitive process after patent 
expiration or the result of a strategic alliance 
between firms.
With respect to pricing, the analysis 
conducted by Saes et al. (2009) drew on data for 
herbicides sold in the state of Sao Paulo. Prices 
were originally collected by the Agricultural 
Economics Institute (IEA). From the classification 
proposed by the Brazilian Association of Generic 
Agrochemicals21, the authors constructed price 
indexes. In the chart above, the label “low” 
corresponds to the average price for the group 
of herbicides characterized by low competition 
(two competitors), “high” is the average price 
for the group of herbicides with three or more 
competitors, and “monopoly” is the average 
monopoly price in the production of herbicides. 
As expected, the monopoly price is always higher 
compared to other prices. In addition, herbicides 
with high competition have lower prices when 
compared to herbicides with low competition.
21 Herbicides with high competition, low competition, or absent 
competition.
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According to the above discussion, the 
characterization of the agrochemical industry in 
Brazil is that of a classic production sector. Basically, 
one can conclude that (i) due to its supply and 
demand characteristics, the Brazilian agrochemical 
market has the structure of an oligopoly with a 
competitive fringe, and that (ii) the available data 
supports the usual ideas about price behavior. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the 
above analysis does not capture key elements of 
the dynamics of firms’ behavior – for example, 
their business strategies. In general, contractual 
relations not only affect the performance of 
the supply chain, enabling the implementation 
of various competitive strategies, but can also 
imply monitoring or the incentives for strategy 
adoption. The existence of contracts between the 
agents acting in the agrochemical industry is the 
cornerstone of investigations into the relationships 
between agents. This kind of information, 
however, is not revealed by secondary sources 
of information, making necessary the search for 
primary data – e.g., information provided by 
agents through qualitative interviews.
4.2. Contractual relations in the  
agrochemical industry
Contracts can be found in the agrochemical 
market, particularly in transactions established 
between dealers and farmers, and between 
cooperatives and their members. The most 
relevant aspect of these transactions is that related 
to the financing of the purchase. One can find 
different purchasing mechanisms: spot purchase, 
hire purchase, and “harvest time” purchase. In 
the case of spot purchase, producers are able to 
buy products at more competitive prices. In hire 
purchase, the financial costs of the transaction are 
usually embedded in the price. In “harvest time” 
purchase, payment is made in kind, characterizing 
a purchasing mechanism that resembles an 
exchange contract of inputs for grains.
In “harvest time” purchase, for the reseller 
to actualize the exchange, a sophisticated 
contractual architecture is necessary so as to 
provide assurances to the system (Figure 4). Insofar 
as agrochemical firms do not engage in grain 
marketing, they team up with traders in order to 
facilitate the transaction.22 Once an operational 
agreement is laid down, the agrochemical firm 
informs the reseller about the availability of 
the arrangement. It then is up to the reseller to 
manage the exchange with producers. Producers 
establish a resale contract with the reseller, and 
the reseller signs a contract with the trader. The 
payment to the reseller is made by the trader, 
which receives the grain (usually soybean) from 
the producer. The reseller transfers the payment 
to the agrochemical firm.
Contracts are always made with the endor-
sement of a notarized security – first-degree 
Rural Producer Bond (CPR)23 – which is issued 
by the producers. It is worth emphasizing that 
when a CPR is registered there is a crop lien: the 
product to be harvested is given as a guarantee 
for the transaction. Moreover, the fact that the 
CPR is a first-degree bond gives it priority for 
payment. In order for producers to perform 
this type of operation they need to acquire a full 
line of products from the agrochemical firm (a 
technological package of at least six products). 
Under-capitalized producers generally adhere 
to this operation mode, although on some 
occasions even well-capitalized producers find 
this arrangement to be favorable.
22 Syngenta, Bayer, and Basf hold partnerships with Bunge/
ADM/Cargill, which undertake to receive a certain quantity 
of soybean.
23 The CPR can be physical via product delivery settlement, 
or financial via negotiated financial settlement. The cost 
for endorsing a CPR ranges between 3.78% and 7.8% per 
annum. Some exchange transactions are made with an 
unregistered CPR, the so-called “CPR de gaveta”, i.e. without a 
formal endorsement from a bank, but notarized by a public 
notary. The total cost of a financial CPR, which is normally 
used as a credit advancement tool, ranges between 15% and 
20% per annum, including endorsement and interest costs. 
This cost also includes registration expenses for the CPR. 
Rates vary according to the risk profile of each client. It is 
important to note that when the CPR is used as a guarantee 
in a transaction, only the costs related to endorsement and 
registration expenses are considered; only when the CPR is 
used as a means to advance financial resources, the total cost 
is considered. Information available in the Brazilian Central 
Bank points to a lack of interest in financial CPRs due to past 
contract breaches.
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Figure 4. “Harvest time” purchase.
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In order to facilitate the delivery operation, 
some resellers keep their own warehouses for 
receipt of grains and subsequent transfer to 
traders. However, few resellers provide effective 
storage service. In general, the operation requires 
resellers to monitor the whole process of delivery 
of grain in warehouses within the region. Failure 
to conduct this monitoring means that a reseller 
may be taken to court on the grounds of failure to 
meet the contractual prerogatives.
The transaction between a cooperative and 
an associate producer occurs in a manner similar 
to that between reseller and producer. 
Cooperatives sell inputs and occasionally receive 
grain for processing and storage. In general, 
cooperatives estimate their members’ demand for 
agrochemicals in a given instant in time and make 
the purchase from suppliers. Some cooperatives 
also provide agronomic advice through their 
technical assistants. The sale of agrochemicals 
can also be either spot, hire, or “harvest time”.
The spot and hire sales mimic the relationship 
between producer and reseller, except for the 
fact that the cooperative may, in theory, offer 
products at better prices. In the case of “harvest 
time” purchase, the cooperative may also receive 
grains and can itself establish a contract for the 
exchange of inputs for grains with its associates, 
selling the end product through the trader. As 
described above, cooperatives can receive credit 
from the traders and pay this funding in cash or 
in kind.
Thus we find that, contrary to what the 
analysis of available data may suggest, the final 
marketing of agrochemicals may not occur 
through a perfect market mechanism in which 
farmers drive up to the counter of a reseller 
(or cooperative) and buy a product in a non-
-recurrent transaction whose consummation is 
instantaneous. This simple finding may have 
important ramifications in the analysis of the 
agrochemical industry. For instance, any estimate 
of elasticity of demand may be biased if one fails 
to take account of the contractual arrangements 
described above.
As a general rule, when estimating a 
traditional demand system what one assumes 
is that the type of transaction is independent 
of product prices and of the other regressors. If 
transaction costs are the same for all products of 
the demand system, then there is no problem. In 
other words, if the type of contract is equal for all 
products, the estimation of elasticity of demand 
is unbiased. A problem arises when a group of 
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Figure 5. Number of contracts (total), soybean production – State of Goiás, Midwest, Brazil.
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Source: Rezende (2008) – prepared by the authors.
buyers use a particular type of contract and 
another group of buyers transact in a different 
way. In this case, estimators may be biased.
In this regard, resellers report that “harvest 
time” purchase represent between 20% and 
25% of their transactions. Representatives of 
the cooperative sector, in turn, state that the 
importance of this contractual mode was higher 
in the past, and that currently it is mainly used by 
less-capitalized producers. Still, in the 2006/2007 
crop, one cooperative from the state of Mato 
Grosso do Sul reported that 50% of its sales were 
made under this contractual mode. In Mato 
Grosso, it is estimated that exchange contracts 
are much more frequent; in the 2006/2007 crop 
almost 100% of the associates adhered to this 
type of contract.
In order to provide a complete overview of 
the agrochemical industry, we must take one 
step further and inquiry about the existence of 
additional (non-contractual) dimensions that 
may influence the transactions. 
4.3. The role of reputation 
One relevant aspect of exchange contracts 
refers to its possible intentional breach. Contract 
breaches can always occur, and in the past 
have mainly occurred due to weather problems 
(e.g., drought) and product valorization. 
Rezende (2008), for instance, studied contract 
breaches by soybean producers in moments of 
substantial price increases.
In the case of soybean production in the 
state of Goiás (a major soybean producer in 
the Midwest of Brazil), Rezende (2008) reports 
a generalized contractual breach in 2003/2004 
due to a sharp increase in soybean prices in the 
international market. At that time, producers 
chose not to deliver the grains to the trading 
companies under the “harvest time” purchase 
price. As a consequence, the availability of 
“harvest time” contracts was reduced in 2004/2005 
(Figure 5).24
Of particular interest, however, is the fact 
that the possibility of contract breach adds an 
ingredient of reputation to the relationship 
among agrochemical firm, reseller/cooperative, 
and producer. Reports from industry sources 
indicate that the occurrence of contract breaches 
24  Rezende (2008, p. 97) notes that one cannot say with certainty 
that the reduction in the number of contracts occurred due to 
the breakdown of contracts, however there are strong indications 
that the facts are closely related. Regarding the increase in the 
number of contracts between 2002/03 and 2003/04, this was due 
to the good functioning of the funding mechanism in 2002/03.
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Table 4. Effects perceived by producers as a result of breach of contract – State of Goiás.
 Producers (%)
Agrochemical firms began to demand greater assurances of credit 50
Negotiations with the companies have become tougher 46
Reduction in the number of contracts 30
Less financial support for production 27
Reduction in the cultivation total area 11
Reduction in the amount of soybeans sold 11
Producer reports no effect 19
Source: Rezende (2008).
in the past has led companies to become more 
severe in the formatting of this type of operation. 
In effect, Rezende (2008) interviewed a group 
of 70 producers on the potential effects suffered 
after the episode of breach of contracts in 2003 
(Table 4). About half of producers reported that 
agrochemical firms began to demand greater 
assurances of credit; 46% of producers said that 
the negotiations with the companies have become 
tougher; 30% of respondents have reduced 
the number of contracts; and 27% had fewer 
resources for their production. 
More importantly, evidence suggests that 
even producers who did not break contracts were 
also negatively affected by the new strategies 
developed by the firms (REZENDE, 2008). This 
aspect is relevant to the extent that even if one 
considers the existence of formal contracts in 
the marketing of agrochemicals, the dynamics 
of reputation should also be taken into account. 
A group of producers that acts in a way that 
diminishes their reputation can have effects 
on the future availability of financing to the 
whole industry. As a result, the conditions of 
the industry (e.g., elasticity of demand) can be 
affected, as well. 
5. Concluding remarks
The aim of this perspective paper is to 
discuss the role of empirical research in unders-
tanding the complex forms of governance in 
agribusiness. The authors argue that there are 
three fundamental levels of analysis: (i) the basic 
structure of the market, (ii) the formal contractual 
arrangements that govern relations within the 
agroindustrial system, and (iii) the transactional 
dimensions governed by non-contractual means. 
The case of the agrochemical industry in Brazil 
illustrates how traditional analyses that only 
address market structure are insufficient to fully 
explain the agricultural sector and its supply chain. 
At present, the information that researchers 
need to examine the new reality of the agribusiness 
sector is not collected by research institutions 
in Brazil. Thus, it is imperative that research 
institutions make efforts to systematize the data 
related to contracts in agribusiness systems. 
It is noteworthy that this type of initiative is 
already a routine in American institutions such as 
Cori25 (Contracting and Organizations Research 
Institute). Cori is a research institution based at 
the University of Missouri / Columbia that has a 
comprehensive database on contracts and a range 
of information on organizational governance. 
Admittedly, the task is not trivial; however, the 
gains for the understanding and analysis of 
complex forms of governance in agribusiness 
systems will be significant.
In Brazil, we could encourage the collection 
of data covering an expanded set of variables. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the main 
variables that could be collected by research 
institutes are:
•	 Basic information about (formal and 
informal) contracts, as well as the degree 
of standardization of contracts;
25 www.cori.missouri.edu 
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•	 Average length of different contractual 
relations (short- and long-term);
•	 Contract clauses: transacted attributes; 
object of contract; bonuses and financial 
incentives;
•	 Frequency (recurrence of the relationship 
over a period);
•	 Contract breach;
•	 Number of agents that transact (for the 
sale and purchase of products);
•	 Contractual modes;
•	 Existence, type, and magnitude of 
transaction guarantees.
Certainly the challenge at hand for the 
collection and organization of these new 
variables is enormous. However, the complexity 
of agroindustrial systems unavoidably requires 
researchers and research institutes to employ 
greater analytical sophistication.
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